Posterior Asymptotics and the Bernstein–von Mises Theorem
Posterior Asymptotics and the Bernstein–von Mises Theorem
Section titled “Posterior Asymptotics and the Bernstein–von Mises Theorem”Tier: R (Research). Builds on measure-theoretic probability and the undergraduate treatment of point estimation. This is where Bayesian statistics meets asymptotic analysis, and where the question “when is the Bayesian answer also the frequentist answer?” becomes a theorem.
Recall prompts
Section titled “Recall prompts”Attempt these from memory before reading.
- State the weak law of large numbers and the central limit theorem.
- What is the Fisher information for an i.i.d. sample? For what class of models is it well defined?
- What is a prior, a posterior, and a marginal likelihood; in measure-theoretic terms?
- Give an estimator that is consistent but not asymptotically normal.
Motivation: the question the theorem answers
Section titled “Motivation: the question the theorem answers”Suppose you have data i.i.d. from an unknown , a prior on a parameter space , and you compute the posterior
As , two things you might hope:
- The posterior concentrates near the truth (consistency).
- The posterior looks Gaussian, centred at the maximum likelihood estimator, with covariance ; the same as the frequentist sampling distribution of the MLE (Bernstein–von Mises).
The second is the remarkable one. It says that after enough data, the Bayesian uncertainty statement and the frequentist confidence statement coincide: a 95% credible interval is asymptotically a 95% confidence interval. That frequentist–Bayes agreement is not automatic, and knowing exactly when it holds and when it fails is an active research area.
Consistency: Doob and Schwartz
Section titled “Consistency: Doob and Schwartz”Theorem (A, Doob 1949). If the model is identifiable and the prior associates probability one to a set of parameters on which the posterior is consistent, then the posterior is consistent almost surely under the prior.
Doob’s theorem is nearly free but nearly circular: it holds prior-almost surely, so a prior that puts mass on bad parameters is excluded by assumption. The substantive result is Schwartz’s.
Theorem (A, Schwartz 1965). If the true is in the support of the prior and the model satisfies an entropy condition; for every there is a sieve of tests separating from the -ball around it, with exponentially small type-II error; then the posterior probability of tends to .
The entropy condition is the substantive hypothesis. It is checkable, it fails in interesting cases, and its failure is what drives most of the modern literature.
Worked example (U). Bernoulli with a Beta prior. The posterior is , which concentrates at at rate for any interior prior. Consistency holds for every ; it fails at the endpoints if the prior puts zero mass there - the beta prior with puts unbounded density at 0 and 1, and consistency at then requires care.
Exercise. Show the posterior mass outside is bounded by for some , using Hoeffding’s inequality on the likelihood ratio.
Proofs of the consistency theorems
Section titled “Proofs of the consistency theorems”Theorem (Doob, proved). Let the model be identifiable; distinct give distinct laws of the infinite sequence; and let . Then the posterior is consistent at -almost every : under the joint law , the posterior of every neighbourhood of tends to .
Proof. Make random with law and generate conditionally i.i.d. given . For a measurable , consider the posterior probabilities
The tower property of conditional expectation gives : the form a bounded martingale, values in . By Doob’s martingale convergence theorem, almost surely, and the limit is the conditional expectation of the indicator against the full data σ-field:
Now the tail structure enters. Under identifiability, the exchangeable tail σ-field of the joint law is (up to null sets) generated by itself, so
up to a -null set. Taking through a countable base of neighbourhoods of and intersecting the countably many almost-sure events gives posterior concentration at -almost every .
The catch, stated. Doob’s theorem speaks under the joint law: consistency holds for prior-almost every . But a -null set can contain open sets when the prior is not equivalent to Lebesgue-type mass on the support - Freedman’s counterexample below exploits exactly this gap. Closing it needs control at every , which is what Schwartz’s testing condition provides.
Theorem (Schwartz, proved in structure). Suppose for a neighbourhood of the true there are tests of versus with exponentially small errors:
and . Then the posterior of decays exponentially: for some .
Proof structure. The two test inequalities bound the likelihood ratio: on , the average likelihood is at most times what predicts, and on the event where the test rejects, the same holds pointwise. Since , the marginal likelihood over is at least , and on the test’s acceptance event the likelihood under any is at most times the likelihood at up to the exponentially small type-I error. Combining:
for the smaller of and up to constants; exponential decay in .
What the structure teaches. Every hypothesis of the nonparametric contraction theorem above replaces one move of this proof. The exponential testing condition is Schwartz’s hypothesis verbatim; the sieve is what replaces the compact complement when entropy is infinite; and the prior-mass condition is the Kullback–Leibler property. Each of the three moves: exponential testing, entropy control, prior mass – is a hypothesis in the modern theorem, and each fails in a way the failure-mode section below documents.
Posterior contraction rates
Section titled “Posterior contraction rates”Consistency is qualitative. The quantitative question is: how fast?
Definition. A sequence is a contraction rate if
for every .
Theorem (A, Ghosal–Ghosh–van der Vaart). Under conditions on the prior’s mass near the truth (a prior mass condition) and on the complexity of the model (entropy with bracketing), the posterior contracts at rate
for a -smooth true density in a nonparametric model.
That rate is the minimax rate; the Bayesian procedure is rate-optimal, which is far from obvious for a procedure defined by a prior rather than an optimisation.
Worked example (A). Gaussian white noise observations with a Gaussian prior on in a Sobolev ball . The posterior contracts at , matching the minimax rate; and the shape of the posterior is then shown by Szabó, van der Vaart and van Zanten (2015) to be not Bernstein–von Mises: the credible sets are not honest confidence sets. Rate optimality and honesty come apart, and that separation is the modern research frontier.
The Bernstein–von Mises phenomenon
Section titled “The Bernstein–von Mises phenomenon”Theorem (A, van der Vaart 1998, Ch. 10; Le Cam). Let be open, smooth in near , the Fisher information positive definite, the prior positive and continuous at , and the model otherwise regular. Then for almost every sequence ,
where is any consistent estimator sequence.
In words. The posterior, shifted and rescaled, converges to a Gaussian centred at the MLE with covariance ; the frequentist limit law.
Worked example (U). The Bernoulli model with a flat prior. The posterior is , which for large is approximately ; exactly the CLT-based sampling distribution of . The theorem says this is generic, not a coincidence of the Beta family.
Why it matters for practice. Under BvM, Laplace’s approximation to the posterior is asymptotically exact, MCMC on a well-behaved posterior gives frequentist-valid intervals, and the choice of prior is asymptotically irrelevant at rate . That last claim is the load-bearing one for objective Bayes, and it is exactly what fails below.
Where Bernstein–von Mises fails
Section titled “Where Bernstein–von Mises fails”This is the research content. Each failure is an active area.
Nonparametric models. As above: Gaussian priors in white noise contract at the right rate but the posterior shape is wrong. Freedman (1999) showed the posterior in a nonparametric normal-means problem can be inconsistent in shape even while concentrating. Cox (1993) and Diaconis–Freedman (1986) gave earlier examples. The resolution; priors adapted to the truth’s smoothness, or honest adaptive credible sets (Szabó, van der Vaart & van Zanten; Bull; Nickl & Szabó); is a substantial modern literature.
Model misspecification. If the true distribution is not in the model, the posterior concentrates on the KL minimiser and BvM holds with the sandwich information rather than ; Kleijn and van der Vaart (2012). The Bayesian answer then matches the sandwich frequentist answer, not the model-based one.
Separation and irregular identification. In mixture models and other singularly identifiable models, the Fisher information can be singular and BvM fails in a strong sense. Posterior contraction can be slower than any polynomial rate; recent work (e.g. on deconvolution and mixture proportions) quantifies exactly how much slower.
High dimension. If grows with , BvM holds only for (Bickel & Kleijn) in smooth models, and in sparse models the posterior can be very far from Gaussian. The interplay between sparsity, priors and BvM is the current frontier.
Prior dependence at rate . BvM says the prior is irrelevant at the first order. At the second order it is not, and that matters for computation, for credible set calibration, and for the behaviour of MCMC.
Proof of the Bernstein–von Mises theorem
Section titled “Proof of the Bernstein–von Mises theorem”The proof is worth reading because its machinery; local asymptotic normality, contiguity; is the same machinery every modern result in this area is proved with: contraction rates, the misspecified version below, and the high-dimensional condition are all proved by running the same argument with harder estimates inside it.
Write it in one dimension. The -dimensional case is identical with a matrix and a vector; only the notation is heavier.
Step 1: local asymptotic normality. Reparametrise to the local parameter and expand the log-likelihood ratio about :
where and in probability, uniformly in in compacts. This is the LAN condition. The two main terms are the score at scale and a deterministic quadratic penalty . Smoothness of and finiteness of give it by Taylor’s theorem; the content of the hypothesis “regular model” is that is controlled.
Step 2: what LAN says about the likelihood ratio. Define
By Step 1, . Under , by the ordinary CLT, and the map is asymptotically the likelihood ratio of a Gaussian shift experiment: an experiment in which one observes with . That is what “local asymptotic normality” means, and it is why the normal shows up on both sides of the theorem.
Step 3: rewrite the posterior in the local parameter. The posterior density of given , at the true , is proportional to
and dividing through by the value at turns it into
Both factors are now under control: the prior factor is bounded, and tends to uniformly on compacts by continuity of at ; and is the LAN expression from Step 2. This is the whole reason the theorem needs the prior to be positive and continuous at ; positivity keeps the normalising constant from vanishing, and continuity makes the prior factor asymptotically constant, which is exactly the sense in which the prior drops out.
Step 4: the main estimate. One shows that for every ,
This is the only genuinely hard estimate in the proof, and it is where consistency is spent. Outside a neighbourhood of the likelihood ratio decays exponentially, by Schwartz’s test condition; the same condition that gave posterior consistency in the section above. The theorem is not independent of consistency; it is consistency plus a local Gaussian approximation.
Step 5: the characteristic function. For the total variation statement claimed, it suffices to prove convergence of characteristic functions on the local parameter, since the tails are already handled in Step 4. For ,
and substituting the LAN form of :
the characteristic function of . Since under , and the credible interval endpoints are continuous functionals of this Gaussian, the rescaled posterior converges in distribution; and by the usual lifting from weak to total variation for measures with densities bounded as in Step 4, in total variation:
Replace by and by any consistent to get the stated form.
What each hypothesis bought. Smoothness and finite information gave LAN in Step 1. Prior continuity made the prior drop out in Step 3. Positivity of the prior kept the denominator alive. Schwartz’s conditions did the work in Step 4, which is why the theorem is stated for a consistent model: BvM is not an addition to consistency but a refinement of it. And contiguity; the only tool not yet named; is what licenses transferring statements between and , which is what makes the local argument legitimate.
Counterexamples
Section titled “Counterexamples”Freedman’s theorem. There exist priors with full support for which the posterior is inconsistent at every parameter in the support. Full support is therefore not enough for consistency; the Schwartz conditions are doing real work.
BvM without consistency. The posterior can concentrate at a wrong point and still be asymptotically Gaussian around it. Consistency and asymptotic normality are separate properties.
Diaconis–Freedman. In a finite mixture of normals, the posterior on the mixture weights can fail to concentrate at any rate, because the likelihood is unbounded and the parameter space is not locally identifiable.
Recall prompts: attempt after reading
Section titled “Recall prompts: attempt after reading”- State Doob’s consistency theorem, and say precisely why it is weaker than Schwartz’s.
- What is a contraction rate? State the rate for a -smooth density under a Gaussian prior.
- State the Bernstein–von Mises theorem and its hypotheses.
- Give three settings in which BvM fails.
- Why does the frequentist–Bayes agreement in BvM not settle the debate about priors?
Interleaving problems
Section titled “Interleaving problems”- (Measure theory.) Show the posterior is a regular conditional distribution of given under the joint law , .
- (Real analysis.) Prove the Laplace approximation and identify where regularity is used.
- (Probability.) Show that for the Bernoulli model the posterior variance is , and compare to the Cramér–Rao bound.
- (Functional analysis.) In the white noise model, show the eigenvalues of the covariance operator of the Gaussian prior on decay as , and connect that to the contraction rate.
- (Decision theory.) Under squared-error loss show the Bayes estimator is the posterior mean, and under BvM show it agrees with the MLE to order .
See Also
Section titled “See Also”- Probability and Statistics: the Tier-F probability background
- Measure Theory; the integral the posterior is defined with
- Functional Analysis: Hilbert spaces in the white-noise model
- How to Use These Notes; the method